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ERODING THE MYTH OF DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE IN FAMILY LAW: THE CHILD
SUPPORT EXPERIMENT
JANE C. MURPHY*
Reliance on judicial discretion to resolve disputes is one of
the most fundamental characteristics of the American legal sys-
tem. Nowhere have judges exercised more unfettered discretion
than in family law. Judicial discretion in this area, however, is
not without its critics. In this Article Professor Jane Murphy rec-
ommends limiting the use of judicial discretion in family law
matters. Professor Murphy argues that the lack ofpredictability
which flows from discretionary decisions undermines our confi-
dence in the equity of decisions and encourages protracted
litigation.
Professor Murphy reviews the developing consensus that
fixed rules are necessary to guide judges' discretion in divorce
dispute resolution. Examining the application of fixed rules to
one particular area of family law-child support obligations-
Professor Murphy demonstrates that the use of fixed rules has
successfully provided judges and parties with a means of develop-
ing more equitable, predictable child support decisions. Profes-
sor Murphy concludes that fixed rules similarly will prove useful
in other areas offamily law that presently are governed by judi-
cial discretion.
Reliance on judicial discretion to resolve disputes in Anglo-Ameri-
can courts has been described as "the most significant twentieth-century
change in the fundamentals of the legal system."' The principal justifica-
tion for the expanded use of judicial discretion is the need for creativity
and flexibility to tailor decisions to the particular circumstances of each
case and, accordingly, to achieve the maximum amount of justice in each
case. Nowhere is this ideal of individualized justice used to justify broad,
unfettered judicial discretion more than in family law. Until recently,
the prevailing wisdom of legal scholars and social scientists has been that
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earlier draft of this Article. I would also like to thank Susan Stauffer and Robin Klein for their
expert research assistance.
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the unique circumstances of each family require broad discretionary
standards in domestic litigation. When a trial judge decides how a family
will reorganize itself after a divorce, the judge exercises more discretion
than in almost any other decision he makes. Where the children should
live, how they will be supported, and how the property will be divided
are all decisions the law commits largely to the discretion of the trial
judge.
Broad discretion in family law decisionmaking is detrimental to the
judicial system and to the parties seeking to resolve disputes. Vesting
judges with such discretion does not enhance their ability to make just
decisions; instead, it jeopardizes fundamental rights of parents and chil-
dren. Vague, indeterminate standards also tend to support the percep-
tion of both men and women that judicial decisions in this area are
arbitrary or discriminate against them on the basis of their sex. Further,
the lack of predictability that flows from broad, undefined standards dis-
courages divorcing parents from settling their disputes on equitable
terms. As a result, the resources of both the judiciary and the litigants
are wasted at a time when both are critically scarce. Finally, by adhering
to such standards in the courtroom, those who seek to improve access to
domestic dispute resolution may view mediation and other forms of alter-
nate dispute resolution as the only alternative to the delays and acrimony
of litigation. Such "reforms" may prove unjust and inappropriate for
large categories of divorcing families.
This Article begins by briefly examining the role of discretion in the
history of family law decisionmaking. Part II of the Article then ex-
plores the emerging consensus that courts and legislators must develop
fixed rules to guide judges' discretion in divorce dispute resolution.2 Fi-
nally, the Article examines the impact of the widespread adoption of a
single fixed rule-the child support formula--on this approach to family
law decisionmaking. Specifically, the Article discusses the effect of non-
discretionary formulae on the process and the results of the litigation of
child support. Has the move from a discretionary standard, allegedly
tied to the needs of the particular child, to a fixed rule for child support
provided the benefits to the parties and the system assumed by fixed-rule
advocates? Are the results more predictable and therefore less likely to
be litigated? Does the fixed rule's guarantee of a minimum level of child
support make women less likely to settle for inappropriately low amounts
of child support notwithstanding custody threats by men? Are the re-
2. The analysis of current laws and proposals for reform in this Article focuses largely on
family law in the divorce context. Many of the arguments the Article offers in favor of fixed
rules, however, also apply to never-married parties involved in family disputes over such issues
as paternity, child support, custody, and visitation.
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suits in child support cases sounder-are custodial parents getting more
reasonable amounts of support for their children calculated without re-
gard for the biases of the decisionmaker? Is the child support model for
decisionmaking adaptable to other areas of family law?
Establishing fixed rules in the divorce decision that will protect the
rights and interests of all members of the family after divorce presents an
enormous challenge to legislators, the judiciary, and family law advo-
cates. Available data on the national experiment with child support for-
mulae reveals the benefits that both litigants and the legal system
experience when fixed rules replace discretionary standards. This success
obligates legislators and judges to develop fixed rules for other areas of
family law. In this way, we can move toward our goal of providing
courts that will allow individuals to resolve their domestic disputes in an
affordable and just manner.
I. THE ROLE OF DIscRETION IN FAMILY LAW DEcISIONMAKING
The problem of finding the proper balance between fixed rules and
discretion challenges all legal systems.3 Throughout the history of An-
glo-American law, discretion has played an increasingly important role.4
Despite the modem trend toward categorical decisionmaking in some ar-
eas,5 scholars throughout the last century have believed that decision-
making models respecting individual differences are central to the
integrity of any legal system.6 Decisions requiring complex judgments
about past or future human behavior have been viewed as particularly
inappropriate for formulae or rules.7
3. The classic debate between legalists advocating justice through fixed rules and empiri-
cists, who argue in favor of justice through discretion, goes back as far as the political philoso-
phies of Plato and Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book II, § 8, Books III, IV (Stephen
Everson ed., 1988); PLATO, STATESMAN 293-300 (Raymond Klibansky & Elizabeth An-
scombe eds., & A.E. Taylor trans., 1961). Although Aristotle spoke of a "government of laws
and not of men" and Plato believed that the wise and fair man presents greater promise for
producing just decisions, both philosophies recognized the need for some mix of law and dis-
cretion. JEROME FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 190-211 (1982).
4. DAvis, supra note 1, at 20.
5. This trend is revealed in fixed rules that have been developed for decisions on issues
ranging from sentencing of criminal defendants to eligibility for public benefits. See generally
John J. Capowski, The Appropriateness and Design of Categorical Decision-Making Systems, 48
ALB. L. REv. 951, 951, 968-80 (1983) (identifying this trend and developing a framework for
evaluating rules).
6. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLuM. L. REv. 605, 606 (1908) (warn-
ing that a "scientifie" rule-oriented approach to the law may be regarded as arbitrary and not
worthy of public confidence). For a more complete discussion of the basic legal principles that
produce a moral legal system, see LON FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAw 33-94 (1969).
7. For example, many scholars believe that fixed rules have limited utility when attempt-
ing to make fair and accurate determinations about past behavior in criminal cases. See, e.g.,
1991]
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Discretion in domestic law has its origins in the concept of the eq-
uity court. Equity courts were established to replace a system of justice
that applied rigid rules in the courts of law with a system that permitted
some measure of discretion. Rigidity, it was believed, was the mark of a
primitive legal order.8 Citizens believed that the law courts could no
longer dispense justice.9 Inflexible application of rules forced the parties
to go to the king for relief. The king appointed chancellors to provide
the individualized justice that rigid courts of law could not; the chancel-
lors' authority gradually developed into the equitable Court of
Chancery.' 0
The use of discretion continued to grow in most areas of Anglo-
American law. Given the complex issues of human behavior underlying
child placement and other family law issues, it is not surprising that reli-
ance on the exercise of judicial discretion became particularly prevalent
in family law. Increasingly, it replaced the development of meaningful
standards and rules in state regulation of the family. In contrasting fam-
ily and property law, for example, Mary Ann Glendon has noted:
In our legal system, property law traditionally has been
and even now continues to be characterized by a high degree of
strict law, due to what are generally thought to be special needs
in that field for stability, predictability, and security of titles.
Family law, on the other hand, is characterized by more discre-
tion than any other field of private law. This fact is typically
explained by a perceived need to tailor legal resolutions to the
unique circumstances of each individual and family. However,
when the fields of property and family law intersect, as they
frequently do, especially when a family is dissolved by divorce
or death, difficult questions arise concerning the proper accom-
modation of the interests served by rules establishing "bright
lines" and those furthered by individualizing discretion.II
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV 1329, 1375-76 (1971) (footnote omitted).
8. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 68-69 (6th ed. 1876).
9. See, eg., DAVIS, supra note 1, at 19; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, As ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 29-31 (1877) (re-
viewing the British roots of the American courts of equity).
10. In time, however, the Chancery Court developed its own rules to guide the exercise of
discretion. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 19. Thus, the recognition that rules should be developed to
avoid arbitrariness and inequity always has tempered the ideal of individualized justice
through the exercise of discretion.
11. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1167-68 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also Carl E.
Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1039, 1052 (1985) (discussing the vagueness of family law standards).
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To understand and evaluate the persistent hold that discretion has
had on family law jurisprudence, it is useful to place discretionary deci-
sionmaking in context with other trends in the field. As many commen-
tators have noted, chronicling the development of family law in this
country in terms of a coherent and conscious development of values or
objectives in family life is difficult. 2 Some generalizations or trends are
discernible, however, which might account for the significant reliance on
judicial discretion in so many areas of family law.
Family law, as it developed in post-revolutionary America, was dis-
tinctly local in nature.13 Opposition to national jurisdiction over the
family characterized nineteenth-century domestic relations law. 4
Although the long-standing denial of federal jurisdiction over domestic
relations continues today, some uniformity developed as a result of the
adoption of complementary or uniform state statutes.'5 For example,
while not many states have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act16 as a whole, the Act has been credited with the adoption of more or
less uniform legislation permitting no-fault grounds for divorce through-
out the country.'
7
To the extent that states have adopted similar domestic relations
statutes, however, they have resulted in consistency or uniformity only in
those areas they have chosen to regulate through fixed rules-marriage
formation and dissolution grounds.' As states have lifted many restric-
tions on marriage and moved to no-fault divorce, these "rules" have
amounted to a broad consensus favoring minimal state regulation in this
12. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 2 (1989); PETER N.
SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 6 (1990); Michael
Grossberg, Crossing Boundaries: Nineteenth-Century Domestic Relations Law and the Merger
of Family and Legal History, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 799, 820 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Grossberg, supra note 12, at 820 (describing nineteenth-century American
laws prescribing who could marry as a "morass of marriage regulations, some universal, others
contradictory, and a few purely idiosyncratic").
14. See, e.g., Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-99 (1890) (overturning a writ of habeas
corpus in a child custody dispute on ground that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations
of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not the laws of the
United States").
15. Beginning in the early twentieth century, the Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws turned its attention to domestic relations law. See History of Efforts to Secure
a Uniform Law on Marriage and Divorce, 6 CONG. DIG. 183, 186 (1927).
16. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
17. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 12, at 39 n.11; Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Role of Court
and Legislature in the Growth of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 699, 701 (1989).
18. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 48-49, 188-90.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
area. Professor Glendon 9 has commented on this dramatic reduction in
state intervention in all aspects of the formation and dissolution of mar-
riage, which has occurred over the last thirty years. The almost total
removal of legal impediments to marriage and divorce has removed the
state from this sphere of family decisionmaking. At the same time, how-
ever, the state, with increased pressure from the federal government in
some cases,20 has intensified its regulation of the economic and child-
related consequences of divorce.21 The statutes in this area, although
relatively consistent in language from state to state, contain vague, unde-
fined standards. An examination of these standards and the negative
consequences that flow from them demonstrates the need to rethink ap-
proaches to decisionmaking in areas states have chosen to regulate.
A. Child Custody and Support
In the area of child custody, a broad "best interest of the child"
standard has replaced prior law utilizing fixed rules in favor of the father
and, later, for a relatively short period, the mother.22 Because of the
vagueness of statutory and common-law definitions of this standard,23
the custody decision, as a practical matter, rests in the near absolute dis-
19. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 63-69 (1987);
GLENDON, supra note 12, at 293-94.
20. For a discussion of federal legislation resulting in states' adoption of child support
formulae, see infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
21. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 197-99, 227-33.
22. For a summary of the role of presumptions in child custody determinations, see Ram-
sey L. Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine- A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 337-43 (1982)
(evaluating benefits of the maternal preference in custody decisions for young children); see
also Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 233-37 (reviewing the histori-
cal antecedents of the "best interest" standard); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Mothers Are Losing:
A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
235, 235-36 (1982) (discussing the history of child custody determinations, beginning with an
irrebuttable presumption in favor of fathers, shifting to a paternal presumption unless he was
found to be unfit, and finally moving to the brief history of the maternal preference).
23. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which provides the best summary of prevail-
ing standards, provides as follows:
§ 402. [Best Interest of Child]
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
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cretion of the trial judge, whose decision is seldom upset on appeal.24 A
scholar advocating the broadest possible standard offers the typical justi-
fication for such a broad standard:
[The court] should avoid all arbitrary rules because they im-
properly limit the decisionmaker's discretion. Each person in-
volved in a custody dispute-the child, the biological parent or
parents, and the substitute parent or parents-is a complex in-
dividual whose emotional, intellectual, and physical needs and
capabilities are unique.... A court must be free to consider all
of these factors and to evaluate their effects on the individual
child's welfare. If custody is awarded because a claimant is a
biological or a psychological parent, these other important fac-
tors will not be considered and the court will have insufficient
discretion to be as responsive as possible to the unique needs of
each child involved in a custody battle.2"
In the ar~a of child support, judges also have relied on broad discre-
tionary standards to decide how much a noncustodial parent must pay.
Although post-divorce poverty of children has made child support an
area of increased federal and local regulation,26 until very recently "the
court's discretion regarding the amount of child support usually
reign[ed] supreme. '  Traditionally, most states' statutes simply have in-
structed the court that a parent has an obligation to support his or her
child.28 Case law has interpreted these statutory provisions to require
courts, when setting the amount of support, to consider the needs of the
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best inter-
est;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child.
UNIP. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
24. RICHARD NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSE-
QUENCES OF ENDING A MARRIAGE 9-10 (1984); Klaff, supra note 22, at 357; Schneider, supra
note 11, at 1052.
25. John W. Ester, Maryland Custody Law-Fully Committed to the Child's Best Inter-
ests?, 41 MD. L. REV. 225, 250 (1982). The courts echo this analysis of the best interest
standard. See Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 419-
21, 381 A.2d 1154, 1164 (1977) (noting that "the intricacies of the many human relationships
that are interwoven into each custody dispute defy [such] simplification.... [There must be]
room for adjustments in individual situations.").
26. See discussion of current developments in child support legislation infra notes 95-104
(federal), 105-14 (state) and accompanying text.
27. HENRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 10
(1981).
28. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451 (Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 501 (1981); MD. FAM. LAWv CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1984).
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child and the noncustodial spouse's ability to pay.2 9 Some states have
expanded the criteria to a series of relevant factors in order to guide the
courts' otherwise unbridled discretion."
B. Alimony and Property Distribution
The prevailing standards for allocating family assets at divorce are
also characterized by broad discretion. With regard to both property
division and alimony, most states provide a list of factors that may be
considered by courts in divorce proceedings. 2 The principles guiding
29. See, eg., Beck v. Jaeger, 124 Ariz. 316, 317, 604 P.2d 18, 19 (1979); Unkle v. Unkle,
305 Md. App. 587, 597, 505 A.2d 849, 854 (1986); Carol S. Bruch, Developing Normative
Standards for Child-Support Payments: A Critique of Current Practice, in THE PARENTAL
CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION: RESEARCH, PRACTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 119, 119-20
(Judith Cassetty ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION].
30. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (1985). The Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act is typical of state statutes of this kind. The Uniform Act provides in pertinent part:
§ 309. [Child Support]
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage... or child support, the court may order
either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to pay an amount reason-
able or necessary for his support, without regard to marital misconduct, after consid-
ering all relevant factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs;
and
(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309, 9A U.L.A. 400 (1987).
31. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 227-32.
32. For example, the Connecticut statute addressing property allocation and alimony pro-
vides only vague statutory guidance. That statute reads:
Assignment of Property.... [Tihe superior court may assign to either the hus-
band or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.... [I]n fixing the nature and
value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court ... shall consider the length of
the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal sepa-
ration, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, voca-
tional skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the
opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court
shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preserva-
tion or appreciation in value of their respective estates.
Alimony.... [T]he superior court may order either of the parties to pay ali-
mony to the other... in addition to or in lieu of an [assignment of property].... In
determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the
award, the court.., shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the
annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station,
occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate
and needs of each of the parties, and the [assignment of property], if any ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-81 to -82 (West 1986).
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discretion in allocation of property and alimony tend to be a blend of
fault, status, need, contribution, and rehabilitation. 3
Justifications for the lack of fixed rules in this area echo those ad-
vanced in the area of child custody and support. As one court put it:
In exercising its broad discretion in rendering a fundamentally
fair and equitable decision in each case, the trial court has the
difficult task of quantifying the value of the supporting spouse's
and [economically dependent] spouse's contributions to the
marriage and determining the rights and responsibilities of par-
ties on divorce. Because circumstances vary so much from case
to case, this court cannot set down a formula for the trial court
to apply in assigning a dollar value for each partner's
contribution.34
In addition to the general argument that individualized decisions are
necessary given the complexity and diversity of families appearing before
the court,35 commentators have offered a variety of rationales for the
persistent hold of discretion on family law. One commentator attributes
the rise of judicial discretion to the distinctly local nature of family law
jurisprudence.3 6 Because "state domestic relations chauvinism" pro-
duced conflicts among state family codes, judges had to develop a
"loosely arranged set of national domestic relations doctrines" to harmo-
nize local law.37 These vague doctrines allowed judges to assume a "pa-
triarchal stance by evaluating state legislation in terms of their
perception of family needs, community interest, and national common
law priorities."38
Carl Schneider and other commentators suggest that the perpetua-
tion of the discretionary standard relates to some degree to society's fail-
ure to articulate and reflect upon the goals of family law.39 Are laws
regulating the family intended to provide the "legal mechanisms mini-
mally required to allow people to order their private lives?"'  Con-
versely, do we view family law as a means systematically to strengthen
the institution of the family, whatever its current definition?41 The lack
of meaningful detailed substantive standards to protect custodial parents
33. JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 592-96 (2d ed. 1985).
34. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 211, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802 (1984).
35. NEELY, supra note 24, at 34-38.
36. Grossberg, supra note 12, at 819.
37. Id. at 819-20.
38. Id. at 820.
39. NEELY, supra note 24, at 1-28; Schneider, supra note 11, at 1050-52.
40. Schneider, supra note 11, at 1051.
41. Id.
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and children after divorce suggests a failure to reach a consensus on the
goals of family law and policy in this country.
Perhaps the most compelling and provocative explanation for the
reliance on discretion in most aspects of the divorce proceeding comes
from feminist legal scholars.42 Mary Becker, for example, contrasts fam-
ily and contract law and offers a gender-based explanation for the rights
versus discretion dichotomy in these two areas.43 At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the ideal of individualized discretionary justice
played a significant role in contract law in the area of remedies. Juries
set damages with few, if any, fixed rules; their only guidance was a nebu-
lous admonition to reach an appropriate decision in light of the actual
injuries, needs, and abilities of the parties to the contract.' Since that
time, however, courts and legislatures have developed rules that severely
limit the jury's discretion.45 Becker notes that no similar movement to
curb the "virtually unbounded" discretion in the area of family law has
occurred." She suggests that the greater tolerance of discretion in family
law than in commercial cases is attributable to the gender of the parties
seeking relief.47
When a commercial relationship collapses, the parties seeking relief
tend to be male. When a family relationship collapses, it is women, not
men, who tend to need and seek remedies such as alimony, child custody,
and support.4" Judges and legislators, who are still overwhelmingly
42. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 12, at 232; Glendon, supra note 11, at 1176-77 (ob-
serving that judicial discretion reflects a reluctance to impose significant burdens on an absent
father in order to force him to support his children); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmak-
ing About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. Rlv. 9, 34 n.75 (1990) (arguing that reluctance to
increase child support results from judicial ignorance of the actual costs of raising children);
Sheri A. Ahl, Note, A Step Backward: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts a "Primary Care-
taker" Presumption in Child Custody Casev Pikula v. Pikula, 70 MINN. L. REy. 1344, 1349-
51 (1986) (noting legislation which amended child custody statute to eliminate presumption of
awarding custody to mother, which courts treated as codification of existing law, leaving con-
siderable discretion to the court).
43. Mary Becker, Address at 1989 American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting
(Jan. 6, 1989). See also GLENDON, supra note 12, at 232 (arguing that today's judges, in exer-
cising their "virtually uncontrolled discretion," tend to protect the former husband's standard
of living).
44. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 873 (1990).
45. See, eg., Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Prod. Dev. & Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 417, 131
S.E.2d 9, 22 (1963) ("Absolute certainty is not required but evidence of damages must be
sufficiently specific and complete to permit the jury to arrive at a reasonable conclusion.")
(quoting Tillis v. Calvine Cotton Mills, Inc., 251 N.C. 359, 366, 111 S.E.2d 606, 612 (1959)).
46. Becker, supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. See Robert E. Caine, Child Support Guidelines: Disaster for Parents, Worse for Chil-
dren, 201 N.Y. L.J. 2 (1989).
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male,49 are more willing to fashion rules to enforce the bargains men
strike in commercial relationships, because they identify and empathize
with the parties and place value on the transactions at issue. In the mari-
tal relationship, however, the decisionmakers neither value nor under-
stand the choices made by the women seeking relief-the traditional
homemaker, for example, who agreed to defer or give up career opportu-
nities and income potential to raise children and provide a home for the
family in exchange for financial and emotional support from her hus-
band. In this situation the discretionary standards-giving primarily
male judges control over women's income from ex-husbands-have re-
sulted in retention by men of a disproportionate share of family assets
after divorce." Thus, Becker maintains that discretionary standards are
used to reinforce male power and female subordination by keeping wo-
men subject to and dependent upon the judgment of mostly male
judges.51
Whatever the historical or ideological reasons for broad discretion,
the documented failure of this approach to provide fair, consistent deci-
sions in family disputes has forced family law experts to consider new
approaches to decisionmaking. In addition to the problem of inequitable
results, discretionary standards result in lengthy, expensive litigation and
long delays before final orders are entered. These severe practical pres-
sures have resulted in a call by an increasing number of scholars, legisla-
tors, and judges for the imposition of more fixed rules in this
discretionary system.
II. THE GROWING CONSENSUS N FAVOR OF FIXED RULES
The impetus for the change from discretionary to fixed rules in the
jurisprudence of family law has come from a variety of sources. The
primary pressures have been economic. Litigating a divorce case with
one or more contested issues such as custody, child support, or alimony
49. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK: STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989 256 (110th ed. 1990) (finding that 83.1%
of legislators in 1989 were male); 9 Bus. LAW. UPDATE 7 (1988) (finding that as of 1988,
92.6% of federal judges were male and as of 1986, 92.8% of state judges were male).
50. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 232.
51. Interestingly, in advocating for fixed rules to protect women in family relationships,
feminist scholars like Professor Becker depart from prevailing feminist thought that rules of
any kind favor established hierarchies and do not conform with women's experience. See gen-
erally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 64-105 (1982) (reporting on research dem-
onstrating that reliance on rules and rights is more common in the male experience). Within
the more specific debate about achieving fairness for women when families divorce, other femi-
nist scholars maintain that a decisionmaking model that recognizes the complexity of relation-
ships has more promise. See Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts Social Change
Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 8-12 (1990).
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becomes increasingly more expensive," and the problem is particularly
acute for low-income families. The lack of affordable or free legal serv-
ices for the indigent in the area of domestic law has increased the ur-
gency to re-examine the factors that contribute to the high cost of
divorce.53 Substantial delays in adjudicating domestic cases also have
prompted proposals for systemic reform in divorce litigation.54
The greatest pressure for change has come from the simple recogni-
tion that decisions produced in the discretionary system are unjust. In
the child placement area, for instance, ad hoc decisions that flow from
broad discretionary standards adversely affect both parents and children.
As one commentator has observed:
The discretionary best interests test would increase the risk of
decisions inconsistent with current knowledge of the develop-
mental needs of children. It also could lead to more decisions
based on value biases against, for example, unconventional
lifestyles .... In addition, the uncertainty engendered by the
discretionary best interests standard may encourage litigation
and increase delays in settling custody disputes. These byprod-
ucts of the discretionary approach raise serious questions, not
only of judicial economy, but of child welfare. Custody battles
and uncertainty about their futures are detrimental to
children.5
Discretionary standards governing the allocation of family resources
after divorce also have produced inequitable decisions. Virtually all
studies examining the economic impact of divorce have found that custo-
52. NEELY, supra note 24, at 93-118; see also Deborah Rankin, Personal Finance: Keep-
ing a Lid on a Divorce Lawyer's Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1986, § 3, at 15 (noting that the
cost of obtaining a divorce can be staggering if the divorce is contested or involves a custody
battle). Data from individual states confirm the general comments on the national level. See
MONTGOMERY COUNTY COMM'N FOR WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COALITION FOR FAMILY
EQUITY IN THE COURTS, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND 2-6 (1989) [hereinafter
MONTGOMERY COUNTY].
53. See, eg., ADVISORY COUNCIL, MARYLAND LEGAL SERVICES CORP., ACTION PLAN
FOR LEGAL SERVICES TO MARYLAND'S POOR vi (1988) (finding that existing free legal serv-
ices were serving less than 20% of Maryland's low-income population with critical legal
problems, including those with domestic legal problems); LISE L. SCHMIDT & RENEE MON-
SON, MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASS'N, FAMILY LAW: A SURVEY OF THE UNMET NEED FOR
LOW-INCOME LEGAL ASSISTANCE 44 (1989). The problem of access to legal services for do-
mestic problems is not limited to the poor. Cf MONTGOMERY COUNTY, supra note 52, at 1, 3
(finding nearly half of those eligible for low-income programs turned away).
54. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, supra note 52, at 15-17.
55. Klatf, supra note 22, at 357-58. In his condemnation of the best-interest standard,
Klaff argues for a return to a fixed rule in favor of the mother as custodian for young children
unless proven to be unfit. Id. at 335-37, 356. His compelling arguments for abandoning the
best-interest test also support the imposition of the gender-neutral primary caretaker standard.
See, eg., Polikoff, supra note 22, at 241-43.
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dial parents and children are financially devastated by divorce.56 Most
families have insubstantial property to divide, 7 leaving redistribution of
family income as the primary means of support for the post-divorce
households. Discretionary alimony and child support standards, how-
ever, consistently have produced awards inadequate to support the custo-
dial household. 8 Social scientists and children's advocates have
documented the negative long-term effect of a reduced standard of living
on the emotional, intellectual, and physical development of children.59
The post-divorce impoverishment of custodial parents, primarily
mothers," and their children often is accompanied by a post-divorce rise
in the standard of living for noncustodial fathers.6'
Finally, and perhaps as a result of the problems discussed above,
public trust and confidence in judges' ability to resolve disputes in this
area are at an all time low.62 Some dissatisfaction is inevitable given the
increased cost of living and emotional trauma that result from any di-
vorce.63 Both men and women, however, increasingly perceive that some
of the most important decisions in their lives will be made for them in an
inequitable way. As Judge Neely has noted, "lilt is almost universally
56. See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEX-
PECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA
323 (1985) (finding that female and child poverty increase after divorce, creating an over-
whelming gap in the standard of living for divorced men compared to that of the children and
ex-wives); Charles Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support Guidelines
in the States, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 199 (1988) (noting that although only one in six
households nationally is headed by females, those same households constitute almost one-half
of the nation's poor families); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal. The Economic
Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 351-53 (1987) (citing studies
conducted in California, Ohio, and Vermont that indicate a grim economic outlook for women
in the years following divorce).
57. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1115
(1989).
58. Id. at 1106-09; see infra notes 80, 86-94 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Martha J. Cox, Economic Support of Children by Fathers Following Divorce:
Some Theoretical and Empirical Considerations, in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGA-
TION, supra note 29, at 157; Judith S. Wallerstein & Dorothy S. Huntington, Bread and Roses:
Non-Financial Issues Related to Fathers' Economic Support of Their Children Following Di-
vorce, in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION, supra note 29, at 135; see also NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 28-37 (1991) (finding that the poverty and economic instability
which may follow divorce have negative effects on children).
60. Cox, supra note 59, at 157.
61. One California study disclosed that the standard of living for noncustodial fathers
after divorce rose 42%, while the standard of living for mothers and children dropped 73%.
Gladys Kessler, Crisis in Child Support: New Federal Legislation to Alleviate the Problem, 20
TRIAL, Dec. 1984, at 28, 29.
62. NEELY, supra note 24, at 1.
63. Id. at 1-5.
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thought that in awarding child custody, setting child support, alimony
and dividing property, domestic courts behave in a high handed, arbi-
trary and unjust way.""
Many legislators, judges, and commentators have looked to alterna-
tive dispute resolution as the panacea to provide quicker, less expensive,
and better decisions in domestic disputes. Proponents of alternate dis-
pute resolution argue that the formal court system cannot handle either
the volume or the kind of disputes presented in domestic relations
cases." Mediation, they argue, provides the greatest opportunity for
crafting decisions to meet the particular needs of individual families.6
Amidst the voluminous literature and initiatives advocating expan-
sion of both mandatory and voluntary mediation, a few voices of dissent
ring out. 7 The dissenters frame much of the criticism of mediation in
terms of the potential for manipulation and unfairness when two parties
of unequal bargaining power negotiate in an informal setting.6 8 An anal-
ysis of mediation from the rules versus discretion perspective also sug-
gests that the shift from the courtroom to the more informal processes of
the mediation setting may be precisely the wrong direction to look for
solutions in this area. Mediation pushes decisions further from the
sphere of fixed rights and responsibilities that provide certainty and
fairness.
The specific problems that flow from undue reliance on discretion-
inconsistent, unpredictable, and unfair decisions-suggest that courts
and legislators also should explore solutions to the crisis in domestic-
relations litigation that retain the principal benefits of mediation-less
expensive and potentially quicker decisions-as well as the guarantees of
sound and unbiased judicial decisions. Fixed rules, particularly in deci-
64. Id. at 4.
65. See, eg., Douglas H. Sprenkle & Cheryl L. Storm, Divorce Therapy Outcome Re-
searckh .4 Substantive and Methodological Review, 9 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 239, 245
(1983) (concluding that mediation was superior to litigation to resolve custody and visitation
disputes where couples have a "reasonable capacity" to negotiate).
66. Id.
67. An analysis of the merits of mediation of domestic disputes is beyond the scope of this
Article. Vigorous debate rages, however, as to its potential for reaching sound, equitable deci-
sions. Compare Janet Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2
LAW & INEQ. J. 21 (1984) (arguing that mediation may afford women more opportunities for
balanced decisionmaking than the adversary court process) with Martha Fineman, Dominant
Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101
HARV. L. REV. 727, 729-731 (1988) (arguing that both the procedural and substantive change
in decisions when custody disputes are mediated rather than litigated create an imbalance in
the divorce bargaining process that disfavors women).
68. Francis E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1542 (1983).
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sions affecting allocation of family resources after divorce, offer these
combined benefits.
First, fixed rules result in more predictable and consistent deci-
sions."9 Byproducts of predictable decisions should include an increase
in early settlements. Lawyers representing parties in divorce litigation
can better evaluate the facts of the case and advise the client of a likely
decision under a presumption or a fixed rule rather than predicting an
outcome under a vague "best interests" or "just and reasonable" stan-
dard.7" If a lawyer can advise litigants of potential outcomes with rea-
sonable certainty, litigants are more likely to enter into settlements to
resolve disputes."1
More definite standards also should facilitate faster and less expen-
sive judicial decisions. Even in cases in which the parties cannot reach a
settlement, the cost of litigating issues of support, custody, and marital
property distribution under determinate standards should be significantly
less expensive than under the prevailing discretionary standards. Illus-
trative of a standard that would make domestic litigation quicker and
cheaper is the primary caretaker rule in custody litigation. This rule in-
structs the judge to award custody to the parent who has been most in-
volved in providing day-to-day care, such as preparing meals, purchasing
clothes, arranging for medical care, education, and social activities, put-
ting the child to bed at night, and waking the child in the morning.72
The rule applies in most circumstances, but is subject to rebuttal upon an
older child's preference or a finding of unfitness.73 Litigation under this
69. Linda Elrod, Kansas Child-Support Guidelines: An Elusive Search for Fairness in Sup-
port Orders, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 104, 110 (1987).
70. Statistics reveal that a substantial number of civil cases, including divorce cases, are
settled under current discretionary standards, despite the vagueness of those standards. See,
ag., Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951, 955 nn.2-3 (1979). These statistics can be misleading, how-
ever. Although the parties ultimately may resolve many domestic cases by agreement, such
agreements rarely happen before filing suit and engaging in extended discovery and one or
more preliminary hearings before the court. Thus, the litigation process consumes enormous
resources before the parties are able to reach an agreement. See NEELY, supra note 24, at 98-
100.
71. Mnookin & Korrhauser, supra note 70, at 956-58. Proponents of child support for-
mulae regularly advance the promise of quicker settlements. Sally F. Goldfarb, What Every
Lawyer Should Know About Child Support Guidelines, 13 FAM. L. REP. 3031, 3032 (1987).
72. West Virginia adopted a version of this rule in Garska v. McCoy, 167 W. Va. 59, 70-
71, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (1981). For a full discussion of the merits of the primary caretaker
rule, see David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 527-38 (1984) (recommending a rule favoring the primary caretaker for
children five and under); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody
and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing for a pre-
sumptive rule in favor of the primary caretaker); Polikoff, supra note 22, at 241-43.
73. Fineman, supra note 67, at 772.
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rule involves straight factfinding based on the parents' child-rearing be-
havior throughout the marriage, not subjective judgment-making based
on expensive expert testimony. 4
Similarly, litigation under discretionary standards for child support
often involves reliance on experts to establish the cost of meeting the
needs of a given child or, at best, extended hearings and testimony from
lay witnesses to establish an appropriate figure for child support. A
formula for fixing child support, like the ones discussed in Part III of this
Article, should require such testimony only to establish the incomes of
both parties and the number of children involved, significantly streamlin-
ing the hearing of this issue. Thus, litigation of child support under a
formula should be quicker and cheaper."
Many commentators also advocate clear-cut post-divorce income-
sharing formulae for alimony and marital property distribution, believing
that they will improve the negotiation process and reduce the costs of
litigation.76 Proposed rules make asset allocation a function of objective,
easily proven facts; readily calculable factors like the number of years the
marriage lasted and the incomes of the parties constitute these formulae,
rather than amorphous factors that attempt to measure fault of the par-
ties or relative contributions to the marriage. As a result, as with child
support and custody hearings under fixed rules, the hearings on alimony
and marital property in a fixed-rule regime would be shorter and less
costly.
The most compelling argument in favor of fixed rules is the promise
of sounder, more equitable decisions. Well-grounded decisions will re-
store confidence in the legal system's ability to resolve domestic disputes
and to treat fairly all family members in a divorce so none suffers disad-
vantage, particularly the children. The application of fixed rules to ar-
rive at more equitable decisions is most promising when courts seek to
divide family assets after divorce to provide for child support, division of
marital property and, where appropriate, spousal support. Formulae
that shift more assets to the custodial family combat unsound discretion-
ary awards that impoverish custodial parents and children.
74. Id.
75. Litigation of child support based on formulae should be quicker and less expensive
than using a needs/ability test. Irwin Garfinkel & Marygold Melli, The Use of Normative
Standards in Family Law Decisions Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24
FAM. L.Q., 157, 174-77 (1990).
76. Singer, supra note 57, at 1119-20; see also Sally Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the
Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM. L. 351, 361-65 (1989) (advocating replacing the cur-
rent criteria for alimony with a substantive standard that requires courts to equalize the stan-
dard of living of the divorcing parties).
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Advocates of child support formulae support their approach by cit-
ing studies predicting that if all child support orders nationwide used
formulae instead of the prevailing discretionary standards, noncustodial
parents would have owed $26.6 billion in child support in 1984, instead
of the $10.1 billion that actually was owed." Collection of court-ordered
monetary relief also would improve under rules setting child support or-
ders that apply to everyone.7" In his critical study evaluating proposed
formulae for child support, Robert Williams found that:
[T]he traditional methods of setting child support awards,
though having the advantage of permitting a case-by-case re-
view of circumstances, can lead to the imposition of markedly
different child support awards for obligors, even if they have
the same number of children and identical income levels. Even
the appearance of inequity created by the inconsistent orders
inherent in the case-by-case approach can cause resentment and
frustration for obligors and obligees alike. Obligors' percep-
tions of inequitable treatment may be a factor contributing to
existing compliance problems with child support as well.7 9
Replacing existing alimony and marital property statutes with post-
divorce income sharing formulae also would produce more equitable de-
cisions in these areas. Currently, courts award women alimony infre-
quently. When they do, those awards are woefully inadequate.8 0
Proposed formulae are based on the principle that marriage is a partner-
ship in which both parties make monetary and nonmonetary invest-
ments, and both are entitled to a return on those investments after the
marriage dissolves.8 ' One proposal suggests replacing or supplementing
vague standards in existing alimony and marital property statutes with a
rule requiring couples to continue their joint financial status for one year
for each two years of marriage.8 2 In contrast to the meager and infre-
quent alimony awarded under current statutes, such a formula more fully
"compensates both traditional homemakers and the much larger percent-
age of divorcing women who have held both domestic and market jobs
and whose investments in their families and in their husbands' careers
77. Formulae advocates refer to two formulae in particular, the Wisconsin Percentage of
Income Standard and the Delaware Melson Formula. Brackney, supra note 56, at 199, 203-05.
78. See ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT
ORDERS: FINAL REPORT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 11-5 (1987).
79. Id.
80. Singer, supra note 57, at 1106.
81. The concept of marriage as an economic partnership is firmly entrenched in the lan-
guage of statutes governing distribution of marital property. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987).
82. Singer, supra note 57, at 1117-21.
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have enhanced their husbands' earning power at the expense of their
own."
8 3
Finally, even in the area of custody, replacing multifactor, highly
discretionary standards with rules such as the primary caretaker pre-
sumption would foster more decisions that ultimately serve the best in-
terests of the children of divorce. Advocates of the primary caretaker
rule argue that it advances the virtues of certainty and predictability
while furthering the goal of producing decisions in the best interests of
the child.84 In applying the primary caretaker rule, decisionmakers must
look to past behavior rather than attempt to predict future behavior.
Judges base decisions on the reasonable assumption that the interests of a
child are best served by preserving the relationship that has been the
primary source of nurturing and care. 5
III. TESTING THE PROMISES: FIXED RULES IN CHILD SUPPORT
DECISIONS
Testing the assumptions of fixed-rule advocates-that rules will pro-
duce quicker, sounder, and less expensive decisions-through empirical
analysis is limited by the fact that courts and legislators have neither
adopted nor used widely most of the proposals discussed above. One
exception exists, however, in the area of child support, where a national
movement has succeeded in replacing broad judicial discretion with fixed
rules. The data emerging from the child support experience suggests that
litigants and the court system are realizing the promised benefits.
A. Background: Implementing The Federal Mandate For Child
Support Guidelines
The inadequacy of most states' discretionary standards in setting in-
itial child support awards took on crisis proportions by the early 1980s.
Insufficient child support had become a major cause of the spiraling pov-
erty rate among women and children.86 Of the 9.4 million custodial par-
ents in 1987, forty-one percent had no child support award. 87 When
83. Id. at 1118.
84. Fineman, supra note 67, at 770-74; Neely, supra note 72, at 180-82.
85. Other proposed fixed rules in the area of custody include a return to the maternal
preference and a presumption in favor of joint custody. See, e.g., Klaff, supra note 22, at 335-
37; Holly Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 27, 27-35
(1985).
86. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY: 1987, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, Series P-23, No. 167,
at 2-4 (1990) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU].
87. Id. at 1.
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courts did award child support, award levels usually were inadequate,
thrusting many children and custodial parents into poverty or a seriously
diminished standard of living.8 In 1987 the average child support for
the 3.7 million custodial parents who actually received payments was
$2,710 per year. 9 Studies estimating the costs of raising children in in-
tact households demonstrate the inadequacy of such amounts of child
support. The average awards comprise only thirty-seven percent of the
estimated average monthly expenditure for children in a middle-income
household and only fifty-five percent in a low-income household.90
When the abysmal record of collecting child support is added to the in-
adequate level of awards, the dimension of this crisis becomes clear.9" In
addition to the inadequacy of the award itself, the traditional system of
virtually unlimited judicial discretion in this area led, as it has done in
other areas, to "pronounced disparities in awards from court to court,
from judge to judge, and from case to case."92 Although some of the
disparity may be attributable to such factors as differences in income of
noncustodial parents, the existence of an alimony award, and the type of
custody awarded, ample evidence supports the claim that arbitrary differ-
ences exist. For example, one study found that in a district court in Den-
ver, the support that judges ordered in single-child families ranged from
six percent to thirty-three percent of the obligor's income.93 In another
study, a random sampling of cases revealed that fathers earning $155.00
per week had to pay anywhere from ten dollars to sixty dollars per week
for one child, depending on the judge.94
These circumstances were brought to the attention of Congress,
which became concerned with the lack of objective guidelines for estab-
lishing support obligations and the resulting inconsistencies in awards, as
88. Lucy Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases An Empirical Study of Es-
tablishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DENv.
U. L. REv. 21, 50 (1979).
89. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 86, at 3-5.
90. Karen Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What it Has Meant Financially to Women
in California, FAM. ADvoc., Spring 1979, at 10, 13-15 (estimating that child support awards
are less than half the actual costs of raising a child).
91. In 1987, only one-half of the women with child support orders received the full
amount. Almost one-quarter received partial payments while the other one-quarter received
nothing. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 86, at 4.
92. Goldfarb, supra note 71, at 3032.
93. Yee, supra note 88, at 28, 52-53. But see MARYGOLD S. MELLI, CHILD SUPPORT
AVARDS: A STUDY OF THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION (Institute for Research on
Poverty, Discussion Paper 734-83) 41-42 (1983) (finding that variations in the approximately
148 child support orders from the four judges studied was more a function of the differences in
income of the parties than of the differences in criteria applied by the judges).
94. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 12 (1986).
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well as the overall problem of inadequate awards." In response to this
crisis in child support, Congress enacted a series of related statutes ad-
dressing the child support problem beginning in the 1980s.96 The Child
Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 required, among other
things, that each state adopt child support guidelines by October 1987.97
The statute provides that adoption of mandatory, presumptive, or advi-
sory guidelines is a condition to a state's receipt of continued federal
funding for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).98 The
guidelines must utilize a quantitative formula, rather than a list of vague,
suggestive factors for decisionmakers to consider on a discretionary ba-
sis. Federal regulations require that the guidelines be "based on specific
descriptive and numeric criteria and result in a computation of the sup-
port obligation." 99
The legislation did not specify the exact method by which states
should adopt the guidelines, only that it be "by law or by judicial or
administrative action."1"0 Individual states, then, had some discretion in
choosing the particular mode of formulating their guidelines, although
they had to design some type of numeric formula. Congress further spec-
ified that the states make the guidelines available to all child support
decisionmakers in the state, including judges, hearing examiners, and ad-
ministrative officers. 10 1
In 1988 Congress passed the Family Support Act, which requires
that every state establish presumptive child support guidelines, again as a
condition for continued federal funding of the state's AFDC program.,° 2
Under this statute, the child support guidelines adopted in each state
must presumptively establish the appropriate child support obligation in
95. H. R. REP. No. 527, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 49 (1983).
96. For a discussion of the federal legislation enacted between 1950 and 1984, see Garfin-
kel & Melli, supra note 75, at 159-60.
97. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 18(a), 98
Stat. 1305, 1322 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1988)).
98. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1990) (stating that an approved state plan is a condi-
tion for federal financial assistance); id. § 302.56(a) (requiring that state plans contain child
support guidelines). Failure to meet federal requirements under this statute can result in a
reduction of federal AFDC funding to a state. A state suffers a one to two percent reduction
the first year of noncompliance, a two to three percent reduction the second year, and a three
to five percent reduction the third. See id § 305.100.
99. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (1990).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988).
101. Id. § 667(b).
102. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1988)); see also 45 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1990) (stating that an ap-
proved state plan is a condition for federal financial assistance); id. § 302.56(a) (1990) (requir-
ing that state plans contain child support guidelines).
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any child support proceeding."°3 The act preserves limited judicial dis-
cretion because decisionmakers may rebut the presumption by a specific
finding that application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropri-
ate in a particular case, as determined under criteria established by each
state.1" These requirements in the act strengthened the federal push for
standardized child support decisions.
As a result of the federal legislation, states have adopted three major
types of child support guidelines.105 The Income Shares Model, adopted
in the majority of states, employs various economic studies to identify the
amount of money parents spend on children in intact families at different
economic levels.106 This amount is then pro-rated between the parents in
proportion to their respective incomes. The noncustodial parent must
pay his or her share as child support; the custodial parent presumably
pays his or her share directly for the child(ren). In this model, because
the economic studies of intact families suggest that families spend a de-
creasing percentage of total income on children as income levels increase,
the guidelines provide for noncustodial parents at higher income levels to
pay a declining percentage of income. 0 7 In addition, most income shares
formulae include cost-sharing for certain child-related expenditures such
as child care and extraordinary medical expenses.108
The Percentage of Income formula is similar to the Income Shares
Model except that no share is calculated for the custodial spouse and no
attempt is made to share costs."19 The formula assumes that a share of
the custodial parent's income will go toward the support of the child.
The noncustodial parent then supplements that direct support with child
support in the amount of a percentage of his or her income. 110 Although
variations exist within this model according to how one defines "in-
come," support awards are a straightforward calculation using either a
specific fiat percentage of the obligor's income or a varying percentage of
income, depending upon the income of the obligor."' Because there is
no cost-sharing in this method, it is a simpler, more straightforward cal-
103. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1988).
104. See id.
105. JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A SUM-
MARY OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 9 (1990).
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id.; see also Diane Dodson, A Guide to the Guidelines: New Child Support Rules Are
Helping Custodial Parents Bridge the Financial Gap, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1988, at 10, 10
(critiquing the Income Shares Model as producing awards that are too low).
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culation than the income shares award. The percentage of income in-
creases, of course, with the number of children to be supported.' 1
2
The Melson Delaware Formula, adopted in only three states, differs
from the other two models by purporting to define child support in terms
of a child's basic needs rather than as a percentage of the parent's in-
come." 3 This formula establishes a basic or primary support amount for
the number of children in the household and then apportions these needs
between the parents based on their respective incomes.' 14 The formula
permits an additional support allocation if sufficient excess income is
available to allow children to benefit from the parent's higher standard of
living.
B. Initial Reaction to the Guidelines
The federal mandate to adopt child support guidelines has focused
criticism on the mechanics of the particular guidelines chosen within a
state, rather than on the question of whether to adopt guidelines at all.
Some debate about the value of fixed rules in this area has occurred as
states have attempted to comply with the federal legislation.
The more theoretical arguments advanced against the use of child
support formulae focus on the appropriate allocation of powers between
the legislative and judicial branches. Some commentators argue that
guidelines, while presenting a quicker method of deciding child support,
undermine the traditional judicial discretion needed to fine tune child
support orders according to the needs of the child and the noncustodial
parent."' 5 According to one critic, judges become mere "computer oper-
ators" in this kind of system." 6 This critic also suggests that guidelines,
whatever their practical impact, inappropriately shift judicial functions
to the legislature." 7 Of course, to the extent that any statutorily fixed
rule replaces judicial discretion, the legislature has replaced the judiciary
as the decisionmaker. Whether this phenomenon is good or bad depends
upon the soundness of the fixed rule." 8
Others argue that, rather than streamlining the decisionmaking pro-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 12-13. This formula is used in Delaware, Hawaii, and West Virginia. Id. at 13.
114. Id.
115. Caine, supra note 48, at 2; see Paul E. Levy, Child Support Guidelines: Point-Counter-
point, ADVOC. (Idaho St. B. Ass'n.), Nov. 1989, at 9.
116. Levy, supra note 115, at 9.
117. Id.
118. For a thoughtful discussion of the benefits of vesting decisionmaking power in this
area in the legislature as opposed to the judiciary, see Clark, supra note 17, at 700-08, and
Czapanskiy, supra note 51, at 10-11.
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cess, the various formulae are too complex, because they require testi-
mony from accountants and other experts to explain their method of
defining income or expenses which may be factored into some equa-
tions. 119 Opponents also argue that, by increasing child support awards,
the guidelines discourage settlements. 20 If child support is set at levels
that are confiscatory and punitive, the argument goes, more custody liti-
gation will result. Further, "with such high levels of support required
... the desire and need for men to preserve assets for themselves would
be significantly increased." 12 ' Consequently, noncustodial parents will
agree only to reduced marital property settlements.
The validity of these criticisms can be tested only after substantial
experience with the child support guidelines. Preliminary data suggests
that these concerns about the guidelines are largely unsupported.
C. The Impact of the Guidelines: An Empirical Analysis
Although a few states adopted guidelines prior to the federal man-
date and already had several years' experience, 122 most states have had
only two or three years' experience with the guidelines. Data on the im-
pact of this experiment with fixed rules, therefore, is limited. Much of
the information available is anecdotal, derived from conversations with
lawyers, judges, and parents involved in the litigation of child support.
The Center for Policy Research (CPR) has conducted the major study of
the impact of the guidelines since states first began adopting advisory
guidelines on a widespread basis in 1987.
In October 1989, CPR presented the results of its study assessing
the impact of the guidelines to the State Justice Institute in Alexandria,
Virginia. 2 ' The CPR study examined data from three states (Colorado,
Illinois, and Hawaii) using the three prevailing guideline models and
compared pre-guidelines child support data to post-guidelines implemen-
tation information. CPR collected data in three ways: (1) it sent ques-
tionnaires to family law attorneys and judges who hear support cases in
Colorado, Hawaii, and Illinois; (2) it conducted in-depth interviews with
selected legal, judicial, and child support enforcement professionals in
119. Caine, supra note 48, at 2; Doris J. Freed & Joel R. Brandes, Child Support Guide-
lines--The Final Chapter?, 201 N.Y. L.J. 3, 6 (1989).
120. Freed & Brandes, supra note 119, at 3, 7.
121. Id. at 6.
122. Carol Schrier-Polak, Child and Spousal Support Guidelines: A Current Update, VA.
LAw., Jan. 1990, at 42, 44.
123. CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THREE MODELS, (1989) (No. SJI-87-11G-E-021) [hereinafter
CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH].
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
each of the three states; and (3) it conducted case reviews of sample sup-
port cases heard prior to and following the adoption of guidelines in each
state.
124
The consensus emerging from the studies and the stories is that
child support guidelines are working. The guidelines seem to realize the
virtues of having rules that fix, with more certainty than before, the pa-
rameters of parents' responsibility to support their children.
1. Consistency of Results
The CPR study indicates that, although the consistency 25 among
support orders improved, the improvement varied with the type of guide-
line used and the income level of the parties. 26 A majority of lawyers
and judges surveyed believe that adoption of child support guidelines has
increased the consistency of the child support amounts that courts
award.1 27 Approximately sixty percent of judges surveyed in all three
states felt that adoption of guidelines had reduced variation in awards.128
Although an even larger number of attorneys reported greater consis-
tency in awards, their evaluations differed significantly with the type of
guidelines the attorneys used in their states. Over seventy percent of at-
torneys litigating child support under an Income Shares Model (Colo-
rado) and sixty-six percent using the Melson Delaware Formula
(Hawaii) believed the guidelines had reduced inconsistency in the
awards. 129 In all of the states, judges and lawyers reported the greatest
reduction in variability in the awards to low-income families.130 Interest-
ingly, the presence of a lawyer still had a major impact on the level of
support awarded. 131
Only about half the attorneys in Illinois, however, reported that the
Percentage of Income approach had increased consistency.1 32  The re-
searchers explained that Illinois attorneys used a similar method of estab-
lishing child support before adopting the Percentage of Income model,
which already may have provided some consistency in awards. 133
124. Id. at 9-19.
125. Consistency in child support cases means that two families with similar incomes, the
same number of children, and living in areas with close to the same cost of living should end
up with similar child support awards. See id. at 60.
126. Id. at 60-77.
127. Id. at 61.
128. Id. at 60-61.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 62, 64.
131. Id. at 63.
132. Id. at 60.
133. Id.
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A second child support study, released by the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) in April 1991, reached similar conclusions on con-
sistency. 134 This study analyzed data from more than 1300 child support
cases in six urban trial courts. Although the study did not focus princi-
pally on the impact of the guidelines, some of its findings are helpful in
evaluating the ability of the guidelines to produce consistent awards.
The authors of the study found that, while variations in the level of
awards continue, almost none of the variation is explained by arbitrary
differences among decisionmakers. 135 Instead, case characteristics, par-
ticularly the number of children, whether the case was an initial award of
support in a divorce case, and whether it was a Title IV-D case,136 were
responsible for much of the variation in support awards. 37 The study
concludes that "child support guidelines are probably achieving one of
the goals of federal child support legislation: general consistency in
awards across cases and jurisdictions after consideration of cost of living
and other case-related factors (including income of the parties)."1 38
In addition to the CPR and NCSC studies, anecdotal evidence from
Virginia indicates that "[m]others, fathers, attorneys, and judges have
reported that as a result of Virginia's implementation of support guide-
lines, support awards tend to be . . . more consistent."1 39 Maryland,
which has had income share-based guidelines in effect on an advisory
basis since 1989, and presumptive guidelines since 1990, reports similar
findings of consistency."4
134. JOHN GOERDT ET AL., THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS AND THE Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ASSESSING CHILD SUPPORT CASELOAD CHARACTERISTICS
AND AWARDS IN SIX URBAN COURTS 1 (1991) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT]. The six courts
involved in the study were selected from a group of 39 urban courts that have provided
caseload data for previous National Center for State Court studies. Each court provided data
on every case in which a final order establishing, modifying, or enforcing a child support award
was entered over a two week period in October 1989. Id. at 2-3.
135. Id. at 21.
136. In 1974 Congress added Title IV-D to the Social Security Act. Under this law, all
states participating in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program are
required to have a public child support enforcement ("IV-D agency") program to help locate
absent parents, establish paternity, obtain and periodically modify support orders, and enforce
those orders. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665 (1982).
137. CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 134, at 21.
138. Id. at 22.
139. Schrier-Polak, supra note 122, at 44. Virginia has had permissive guidelines based on
the Income Shares Model since 1988; the statute was amended to make the guidelines pre-
sumptive in 1989. Id.
140. Lois Stovall, Testimony before the Family and Juvenile Law Section Council of the
Maryland State Bar Association, 2-3 (February 1989). Ms. Stovall, a member of the Family
Law Committee of the Maryland State Bar Association, based her testimony on interviews
with lawyers, judges, and litigants throughout the state of Maryland over a six month period.
Id. at 1-2.
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2. Settlement Rates
Although each state's guidelines vary, all share the common benefit
of predictability. Under each of the three prevailing models, the parties
or lawyers in the child support proceeding can predict the probable
amount of child support provided they know the number of children sub-
ject to the support order and the income of both parents.1 41 This infor-
mation normally will be accessible to both sides with limited discovery.
Most statutes permit the judge or hearing examiner some discretion to
deviate from the guidelines in extraordinary circumstances which the
statute may specify.142 Even with a reserve of discretion, the formulae
permit a starting point for negotiation or litigation that the prior system
of near-absolute discretion lacked completely. Although currently am-
biguous, the boundaries of statutorily reserved discretion, narrow on
their face, will become clearer as parties litigate cases and judges define
"extraordinary." '143 The empirical evidence tends to confirm that the
predictability resulting from this fixed rule has increased the number of
settled child support cases.
CPR's findings in this area are, at first blush, mixed."' In all three
states, both judges and attorneys generally agreed that guidelines led to
more settlements on child support.1 45 The researchers, however, ana-
lyzed pre- and post-guideline cases in these states and found no post-
guideline decline in the number of cases in which parents contested child
support orders and went to full judicial hearing.1 46 The fact is that in all
three states studied-indeed nationally-the overall number of cases go-
141. For example, under a typical Income Shares Model guideline, a table indicates the
presumed level of support for a given number of children under a given combined parental
income. The table then divides the support amount by the percentage of the total income
which each parent contributes. The noncustodial parent's share is the ordered child support
award in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. See, eg., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§§ 12-201 to -204 (Supp. 1989).
142. The typical statute permits judges to exercise this discretion to order child support
which deviates from the guidelines only when they find that application of the guidelines
would be "unjust or inappropriate" in a given case. The statutes specify factors that may lead
to such a finding. See, e.g., id. at § 12-202(a)(2)(II).
143. The early decisions interpreting the presumptive guidelines mandated by the Family
Support Act of 1988 suggest that the scope of discretion to depart from the guidelines will be
interpreted narrowly. See, e.g., Gates v. Gates, 83 Md. App. 661, 666-67, 577 A.2d 382, 385
(1990) (stating that criteria to rebut the presumption that the guidelines will apply are the
factors set forth in the statute).
144. CENTER FOR PoLIcY RESEARCH, supra note 123, at 60-64.
145. Id. at 28.
146. The CPR study found that between 75% and 87% of lawyers and 65% and 90% of
judges in the three states agreed that settlements had increased after the guidelines were en-
acted. The number of cases in which the issue was adjudicated stayed relatively constant
before and after adoption of the guidelines at about 4% of cases filed. Id.
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ing to hearing always has been quite small in relation to the number of
cases filed and settled. Judges and lawyers may be responding to the lack
of extended discovery and negotiations on child support, which the for-
mulae have replaced. It is not surprising, therefore, that lawyers, and to
a lesser extent judges who may monitor settlement negotiations at the
pretrial stage, have observed substantial improvements in the settlement
process even though the number of settlements has not changed.
Anecdotal evidence from Virginia shows that "[s]ettlements reflect-
ing the support guidelines have replaced unnecessary court hearings, and
costs have been reduced because all concerned can predict in advance
what the support award is most likely to be."' 47 In Maryland, much of
the feedback from litigants, lawyers, and judges is similar-the guidelines
help settle cases. 4 ' Some attorneys report that the increased levels of
support under the guidelines actually have discouraged settlements.
Many believe, however, that this phenomenon is temporary and will re-
verse itself when lawyers conducting negotiations confidently can advise
their clients that the judges probably will order the guideline level of
support after a hearing.'4 9 Similarly, a study of the impact of the guide-
lines by judicial personnel in one judicial district in Texas reveals a small
increase in settled and stipulated child support cases since enactment of
its income shares guidelines. 150
Anecdotal evidence from a law school clinical program in Mary-
land' reveals that the existence of advisory guidelines in the state
changed the tone of settlement discussions.' Parties no longer throw
child support in the "pot" with other economic issues in settlement dis-
cussions. Assuming pre-negotiation discovery has been adequate to es-
tAblish the incomes of both parties and the relevant expenses,' parties
can begin settlement discussions on this issue with a worksheet indicating
a fixed amount of child support. For attorneys experienced with the
147. Schrier-Polak, supra note 122, at 44.
148. Stovall, supra note 140, at 2.
149. Interview with Marty McGuire, Assistant State's Attorney of the State of Maryland,
Non-Support Unit, Baltimore, Maryland (Jan. 5, 1990).
150. CHILD SUPPORT INSTITUTE, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, SETTING CHILD SUPPORT
UNDER THE GUIDELINES: WHAT DISCRETION Is LEr? GG-1, GG-3 (1987).
151. Data from the author's work in the Family Law Clinic at the University of Baltimore
School of Law, in which approximately twenty students each year represented 60 to 80 clients
in domestic cases. Of these cases, approximately half raise issues of child support.
152. Even before the guidelines became a rebuttable presumption in February 1990, 17
counties in Maryland had been using the guidelines for a year. Telephone interview with
Frank Traglia, Acting Executive Director of the Child Support Enforcement Administration,
State of Maryland (Jan. 5, 1990).
153. Many states adjust the amount of child support for expenses like child care and health
insurance. See, eg., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-201(d) (Supp. 1989).
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guidelines, the worksheets eliminate protracted discussions about the le-
gitimacy of claimed expenses or debts on either side; parties often incor-
porate the guideline amount into the agreement. Even when attorneys
are less familiar with the guidelines, a worksheet establishing support
under the formula focuses discussion and ultimately raises the support
levels that parties consider in negotiation.154
Another finding in the CPR study which may signify increasing set-
tlements is a comparison of awards judges set after a hearing and those
produced under voluntary agreements.155 The study found a narrower
gap in the levels of these two types of awards after the guidelines were
adopted. Before enactment of the guidelines, the average award after ju-
dicial hearings was almost one-and-a-half times greater than the average
negotiated award. 56 After adoption of the guidelines, the difference de-
clined to a four percent discrepancy between judicial awards and those
developed by voluntary agreement. 157 While this finding does not ad-
dress directly whether divorcing couples settle more cases, the narrowing
of the gap between post-hearing and settled child support awards sug-
gests that parties use the guidelines as negotiating tools to reach settle-
ments that reflect the guideline amount.
3. Time and Expense of Litigating Child Support
Moving from a multifactor discretionary standard to a numeric
formula also has reduced the time and expense of litigating child support
awards.15 8 The attorneys and judges that CPR surveyed in its study
found each of the guideline models to be relatively straightforward and
easy to calculate. 59 Because the Income Shares and Melson formulae
are more complex than the Percentage of Income model, it is not surpris-
ing that attorneys and judges felt that these models were difficult for par-
154. Interestingly, while many practitioners reported that the existence of guidelines has
facilitated settlements on the issue of child support, some judicial personnel hearing child sup-
port cases in Maryland do not believe that the guidelines have had a positive impact on settle-
ments. Bonita J. Dancy and Bernard Raum, Remarks at Child Support Guidelines
Conference, Baltimore, Maryland, (March 28, 1990) [hereinafter Child Support Guidelines
Conference] (responding to attorneys' comments). As mentioned above, this reaction may
result from the fact that hearing examiners do not observe the benefits yielded by the guide-
lines in the negotiation process. In addition, the overall numbers of cases settled are more
likely to increase after attorneys have had more experience with the guidelines and can advise
their clients on the relative inflexibility of this fixed rule.
155. CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 123, at 63.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 23-27, 29-30.
159. Id. at 23-25.
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ents and, to a lesser extent, nonattorney court personnel to use. 16°
Because substantially more attorneys and judges using these two models
had received training than those using the Percentage of Income model,
attorneys and judges did not experience difficulty in applying the Income
Shares and Melson formulae. 16 1
The authors of the study also analyzed the amount of time elapsing
between the filing of a case and the promulgation of a final order. In
both Hawaii and Colorado, post-guideline cases were processed to final
order more quickly. After guidelines were enacted in Hawaii, the time
between filing of the case and entry of the final order declined from nine
to 7.2 months. 162 Colorado experienced a similar decline, dropping from
9.5 to 7.4 months. 163 Only Illinois failed to show a statistically signifi-
cant drop in pre- and post-guideline adjudication time.16  The authors
suggest, however, that such a failure was due to the large increase in
cases in Illinois courts in more recent years; the increased caseload acted
to offset speedier adjudications of child support under the guidelines. 16
The reduction of time in litigating child support cases certainly
should result in reduced expense for divorcing couples since the most
significant cost in domestic litigation is attorney fees. Although not all
delay will lead to increased fees, generally the longer a case continues,
the greater the fees in the case. 66 In addition, the relative ease of
presenting a case under a formula should eliminate the need for costly
experts or complex evidentiary presentations.
67
160. Id. at 23.
161. Sixty-one percent of Colorado attorneys and 72% of Hawaii attorneys reported hav-
ing received training in the use of the formulae, compared to only 30% of Illinois attorneys.
Id. About one-half of the judges using the Income Shares and Melson formulae had received
training but only 11% of the judges in Illinois received training to apply the Percentage of
Income formula. Id. at 23-24.
162. Id. at 29.
163. Id. at 29-30.
164. Id. at 29.
165. The authors of the CPR study reviewed samples of cases decided before and after the
implementation of the guidelines. Id. at 11, 29.
166. NEELY, supra note 24, at 98.
167. See supra text accompanying note 75. Despite the rather obvious conclusion that
replacing the multi-factor discretionary standard with a numeric formula will streamline the
hearings in child support cases, some judges surveyed in Maryland did not believe that the
content and length of hearings would change with the enactment of the guidelines. Child
Support Guidelines Conference, supra note 154. As appellate courts make clear the scope of
child support hearings under the guidelines, we can expect more trial judges and other court
personnel to feel comfortable narrowing the evidence that is admissible in such hearings. See,
eg., Gates v. Gates, 83 Md. App. 661, 666, 577 A.2d 382, 385 (1990) (holding that "[t]he
standardized worksheets indicate that the child support determination will be purely numeri-
cal with little, if any, room for the former factual considerations.").
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The NCSC study found that a large percentage of single parents,
especially among poor women, still do not have child support orders.' 68
Although the study did not specifically address the question of whether
post-guideline child support hearings have been streamlined, this finding
suggests that access to proceedings to obtain child support orders has not
improved for all segments of the population.
4. Level and Adequacy of Support Orders
The most important benefit that fixed-rule advocates promise is
sounder, more equitable decisions. In most contexts it is difficult to as-
sess whether fixed rules foster equity. The overwhelming evidence of
post-divorce poverty among custodial parents suggests, however, that in
the area of child support, sounder decisions usually mean higher
awards. 6 9 Here, the post-guideline evidence is quite clear: The CPR
study reveals a "statistically significant increase" in post-guideline award
levels. 7° The impact of the guidelines varied somewhat depending upon
the income level of the parents involved, but all levels experienced in-
creases. Among the three states studied, "post-guideline award levels in-
creased twenty-six percent in low income families, fifteen percent in
middle income households, and . . . six percent in upper income
cases."' 7 1 It is not surprising that the state with the worst record in or-
dering adequate child support-Hawaii-suffered the greatest impact,
and the state in which a preguideline sample showed a relatively high
award level-Colorado--felt the least significant impact.172 Apart from
a finding that the Percentage of Income model that was used in Illinois
produces somewhat lower awards in households with more than one
child, the report concludes that "there is little evidence that one state or
one formula generates consistently higher awards."' 73
It is clear that child support formulae produce higher awards than
discretionary awards, but whether these formulae produce adequate
awards is a far more complicated question. Obviously, the primary
source of inadequate awards in low-income families is the poverty of both
parents, a problem that is largely unaffected by the use of rules or discre-
tion to make child support decisions. The majority of attorneys and
judges surveyed did not believe that post-guideline awards would be suffi-
168. CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 134, at 24.
169. CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 123, at 37-53.
170. Id.
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cient for low-income families.174 Attorneys and judges responding to the
survey consistently acknowledged that "the solution for these families
goes well beyond the manipulation of a child support guideline and re-
flects the more basic problem of extreme income limitations."' 75
Some evidence exists, however, that the lot of low-income custodial
parents and children has improved under the guidelines. The CPR study
compared the percentage of income that parents spend on their children
in intact low-income families with the percentage of income that parents
spend on children in post-guideline award families and found the figures
to be quite close in all three states.17 6 In addition, the fact that post-
guideline increases in support orders were greatest in the low-income
families studied indicates that the guidelines have increased child support
for those families who need it most. 177
Lawyers and judges surveyed generally perceived post-guideline
award levels to be adequate in middle- and high-income families. 7 1
Again, the use of child support guidelines has brought the amount of
family income that is spent on children through child support orders to a
level that closely corresponds with estimated expenditures on child rear-
ing in intact middle-income families.' 79
In high-income families,' the guidelines did not always narrow the
gap between the amount of family income spent on children in intact
versus single-parent homes. Under the Percentage of Income model,
post-guideline expenditures in high-income households equalled twenty-
two percent of combined parental income, compared to nineteen percent
in intact households.' 8 ' In Hawaii, which employed the Melson formula,
the guidelines narrowed the gap but post-guideline expenditures were
still below those reported for intact homes."8 2 Colorado, which em-
ployed the Income Shares formula, even experienced a drop in the per-
centage of income spent on children after enactment of the guidelines.8 3
Despite the differential impact of the guidelines upon the application
of the three models to high-income families, most attorneys and judges in
174. Id. at 54-55.
175. Id. at 55.
176. Id. at 54-55.
177. Id. at 58.
178. Id. at 56-58.
179. Id. at 56.
180. High income families are defined as single child families with combined parental in-
come of $50,000 or more. Id. at 57.
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the three states agreed that the guidelines produced equitable and ade-
quate awards.1 As the authors of the study conclude, "[c]learly the
question for families at [the high] income level is the extent to which
children should participate in the higher standard of living of an absent
parent, not whether minimal needs are being met." '185 The NCSC study
did not address the issue of the adequacy of awards but noted "an under-
lying assumption that awards provided under guidelines should provide
at least minimally adequate support."' 18 6
Preliminary studies examining post-guideline award levels in New
Jersey,18 7 Maryland,188 and Texas18 9 confirm substantial increases in
child support awards after the adoption of guidelines. Although these
studies do not analyze the impact of the guidelines across income lines,
some of the findings of the CPR study presumably would apply. Thus,
increases in awards would be most substantial in low-income families
while the impact would become less significant as family income
increases.
Given the similarity between child support formulae and other
numeric methods for determining alimony and marital property awards,
it is reasonable to assume that all such formulae will produce the benefits
revealed in the child support data. Assuming a relatively simple and
straightforward calculation, these formulae should produce predictable
and consistent results that more fairly allocate family resources after
divorce.
While the costs of limiting individualized judicial determinations
may be greatest in the area of child custody, the success of the child
support guidelines suggests that courts and legislatures should consider
more widespread adoption of the primary caretaker rule. The benefits of
the predictability and underlying soundness of such a rule may outweigh
the benefits some families realize after extended litigation under a best-
interest standard.
184. Id. at 58.
185. Id. at 59.
186. CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 134, at 23.
187. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT SERVICES, NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS, NEW JERSEY CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES FIRST YEAR EVALUATION 17
(1987) (finding that the Income Shares Guidelines in that state increased support in a relatively
low income population by approximately thirty percent).
188. Diane Dodson, Address at the Money, Power & Gender Conference (Sept. 23, 1989).
189. Susan C. Blackwell, Note, Child Support Guidelines in Texas: A Step in the Right
Direction, 20 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 861, 890 & n.2 (1989) (citing study in CHILD SUPPORT
INSTITUTE, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, SETTING CHILD SUPPORT UNDER THE GUIDELINES:
WHAT DISCRETION IS LEFT? GG-1 (1987)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Under current standards, decisions on such critical issues as spousal
and child support, distribution of marital property, and child custody
rest largely in the hands of a single judge, whose decision will be guided
only by broad indeterminate standards. While theoretically advancing
the goal of crafting decisions to fit the needs of diverse individuals and
families, the heavy reliance on judicial discretion in family law must be
re-examined. The absence of rules fixing rights and responsibilities of
parties involved has contributed significantly to the crisis in divorce dis-
pute resolution. Inconsistent, unpredictable, and inequitable decisions
are a byproduct of this discretionary system of justice.
New approaches to family law jurisprudence are needed by the legal
system and by the parties who look to that system for relief during times
of great need and personal crisis. Parties to family disputes, like parties
to property or contract disputes, need the predictability and security en-
gendered by laws establishing clear rights and responsibilities. These
rights-the right to a predictable, bias-free custody decision; to a reason-
able amount of child support which, for many custodial families, is essen-
tial to meet basic needs; and to a guaranteed minimum return on one's
long-term investment in a marriage, an investment that represents for
many parties their life's work-are at least as fundamental as the right to
secure title to a piece of land or to obtain financial relief when a contract
is breached.1 90 Further, laws which fix responsibilities with some uni-
formity and certainty will encourage both compliance with and respect
for the law.
While not all areas of family law are susceptible to a rule or formula,
the recent national experience with child support guidelines suggests that
fixed rules can work. The data on the impact of child support guidelines
is limited at this early stage of implementation. Available information,
however, suggests that applying a fixed rule to the calculation of child
support will reduce the negative consequences experienced under the
prior discretionary standard. Certainly, improvements upon the existing
rule are necessary. States have enacted a wide variety of guideline mod-
els, each of which has its virtues and its problems. Although some mod-
els embody underlying economic data which results in awards that are
too low, some models permit too frequent deviation from the guideline,
and others may be so rigid as to cause hardship in selected cases. But the
190. The Supreme Court has recognized that a parent's right to "the care, custody, man-
agement and companionship of [his or] her children" is an interest "far more precious" than
any property right. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). See also Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (recognizing the importance of the parent-child
interest, which warrants deference and protection).
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basic ingredients for a workable fixed rule are definitely present. Guide-
lines have reduced the number of cases litigated; those that the parties do
not settle are litigated more quickly and with less expense. Child support
orders, whether produced by agreement or after a hearing, are more con-
sistent. Most important, guidelines are fostering more equitable and ade-
quate support.
Scholars and those actively involved in the divorce decision are de-
veloping creative and fresh approaches to other family law decisions.
These include the primary caretaker presumption to limit the scope and
indeterminate nature of the child custody standard, as well as the post-
divorce income sharing formulae to replace the discretionary standards
for alimony and marital property distributions. Further research and ex-
perimentation with these and similar proposals promise protection for
those most vulnerable in the divorce decision, the economically depen-
dent spouse and minor child. Judges and legislators should study these
proposals and take an active role in developing this emerging approach
to family law decisionmaking.
The ideal of discretionary justice certainly has a place in family law.
However, given the disastrous impact of the discretionary system on the
post-divorce family, courts, legislatures, and family law scholars must
examine new approaches to resolving domestic disputes. Professor Co-
hen predicted that "a new reform wave" would be necessary to "harden"
equity and meet the "social demand for certainty" in legal disputes.1 9'
After years of a highly flexible and adjustable treatment of family law
cases, the time for such reforms has arrived; only when they evolve will
the courts be able to offer meaningful protection to all parties involved in
domestic disputes.
191. MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 261 (1967).
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